. It had provided continuity in government for five years, unemployment was less than 9% and falling, the economy was growing strongly, tax receipts were rising, and Ireland's borrowing costs were low. It had introduced some substantively and symbolically important reforms, such as same-sex marriage (see Elkink et al. 2016 ) and candidate gender quotas. Although the government parties -especially the Labour Partywere perceived to have broken key election promises, they had also kept many promises:
44% of their manifesto pledges were fulfilled fully and 18% partially, a higher tally than previous governments in good economic times (Costello and Thomson, forthcoming) .
Alongside these successes, policy failures and social problems abounded. A housing and homelessness crisis was rapidly deteriorating: the number of homeless children in Dublin doubled to 1,570 in the year to January 2016. Youth unemployment and emigration remained high. The government had abandoned its central healthcare policy of Universal Health Insurance; by botching the establishment of a national water utility and the introduction of water charges it had allowed a large anti-water charges movement to gain momentum; and it had disappointed on promises of political reform.
The Taoiseach was constitutionally obliged to call an election by 9 March 2016; in Autumn 2015, its timing became the focus of intense speculation. Some Fine Gael TDs pushed for an election to follow the October Budget, and the normally sober newspaper of record, The Irish Times, led in early October with the headline that a 'November election looms as Kenny to reveal key pledge'. However, the Labour Party, facing the prospect of significant seat losses, successfully opposed the calling of a November election.
Early in the new year, the timing of the election was signalled quite clearly, while maintaining some room for manoeuvre. Three of the four main parties -Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, and Labour -held their party conferences in January.
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The government granted the President, who is a key figure in the process of dissolving the lower house, permission to go on a holiday from 14 to 24 February. At a cabinet meeting on 2 February, the Taoiseach informed ministers that he would seek to have the Dáil dissolved the following day. After a perfunctory statement to the lower house on 3 February, he announced the election date by way of a video message on social media: Friday 26 February.
The government's campaign got off to a faltering start. Some journalists felt that Kenny handled the dissolution of the lower house poorly and that he was avoiding engagements with traditional news media. He struggled to explain core elements of his party's economic policies. There was little scope for increasing spending or reducing taxes in the years ahead, but the extent of that 'fiscal space' became a key issue. Fine Gael's estimate was exposed by Sinn Féin as being an overstatement and all of the main parties identified figures higher than the national Fiscal Advisory Council's estimate of €3.2bn. Fine Gael's main messages were to 'keep the [economic] recovery going' and to choose political stability over 'chaos'. Both government parties framed their main competitors -Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin -as parties that had 'wrecked' the economy and that 'would wreck' the economy, respectively. They pointed to Portugal as an example of the dangers of post-election uncertainty (Fernandes 2016) ; to Spain, where no new government had formed after its December election; and to Greece's difficulties under a Syriza-led coalition as a reason not to support anti-austerity parties (Rori 2016) . During the campaign, they increasingly emphasised economic threats, including global risks, a UK exit from the EU, and the response of mobile capital to an unstable or unorthodox coalition. Some commentators drew parallels with the British Conservative Party's campaign in 2015 (Green 2 Sinn Féin, which had scheduled its conference for February, postponed it until after the election to avoid consuming its allocation of media coverage during the campaign with a party conference.
and Prosser 2016) and indeed Fine Gael had turned to that party and their consultants for advice as they prepared for the election; in late January, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron endorsed Fine Gael's 'long term economic plan'. Some frustration at the failure of their strategy was perhaps evident when, days before polling day, the Taoiseach referred to voters in his hometown who did not appreciate the government's achievements as 'whingers'.
The Labour Party tried to distinguish itself from its coalition partner and, indeed, it differed from Fine Gael on a range of issues, such as taxation, the place of religion in education, abortion, and the goal of universal free General Practitioner healthcare by 2020. It emphasised that it was required for 'balance' in government. Just before the campaign began, President Michael D. Higgins, a former Labour TD, declared that parties' emphasis on tax cuts (and, implicitly, Fine Gael's policy) was not compatible with an ethical society. This was controversial, as the President is expected to remain at a remove from day-to-day politics.
Fianna Fáil approached the election in a difficult position: although the party had disposed with apologies for its role in Ireland's economic crisis early in the parliamentary term, its reputation for competence on economic policy was in tatters; there were limits to how much it could credibly oppose measures that it had initiated in the previous government;
and it was divided on the major 'moral' issues of the moment: same-sex marriage and abortion. Its leader, Micheál Martin, majored on 'fairness' -a theme that the party had developed over several years -and he described his party as belonging to the centre-left. The beginning of the election campaign coincided with two gang-related killings in Dublin that highlighted the problem of organised crime. This put pressure on the government, but above all it put Sinn Féin in a difficult position. The party was opposed to the non-jury Special Criminal Court (SCC), which was intended to deal with organised crime, and which had tried members of Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In the aftermath of the killings, the SCC was supported in public opinion by a majority of two to one. At the same time, a prominent Sinn Féin supporter was in the process of being sentenced by the SCC for tax evasion. His sentence of 18 months in prison was delivered on polling day.
Opinion polls frequently drove the media agenda during the campaign. As it entered its final week, there seemed to have been little detectable change in party support (Louwerse 2015 (Louwerse , 2016 . Crucially, the government parties had made no progress towards building the electoral base that they would need to return to office without significant additional support in parliament. Local opinion polls in some of the 40 multi-member constituencies also took a prominent place in the news media indicating, amongst other things, that the Labour party leader would lose her seat; that the Renua Ireland leader was at risk of losing her seat; and that the Green Party's leader would fail to win a seat.
In the months before the campaign, Fine Gael and Labour each stated their preference for remaining in government together. Fianna Fáil ruled out coalition with the two other parties that were likely to emerge with most seats -Fine Gael and Sinn Féin -yet insisted that they intended to enter government. Sinn Féin ruled out entering government as a junior partner.
In late January, attention turned to the Independents from whom Enda Kenny would seek support and, in particular, whether he would seek support from the disgraced (yet electorally successful) former Fine Gael minister Michael Lowry (see Byrne 2012: 160-8) .
After spending some days avoiding foreclosing this option, the Fine Gael leader eventually ruled out any 'dealings' with Independents. As the government parties' failure to gain support became clear, a novel Fine Gael-Fianna Fáil coalition became more likely. Kenny avoided ruling this out for some of the campaign but ultimately, during a televised leader's debate, he said that he would 'certainly not' do business with the Fianna Fáil leader. Intra-party tensions about candidate-selection are a regular feature of Irish politics and the months before this election proved particularly lively in this regard. In late 2015, a Fine Gael TD took his own party to court after not being selected as a candidate, forcing them to add him to the ticket. A smaller Dáil of 158 TDs (down from 166 in 2011) and new candidate selection gender quotas of 30% -to be achieved on pain of losing half of a party's public funding -led to some unedifying public rows between party members. In several cases, the parties imposed female candidates on local constituency organisations. A Fianna Fáil member took a legal challenge against the quotas, but failed due to his lack of legal standing to take the case. Ultimately, almost 30% of candidates (163 out of 551) were women, a substantial increase from 15% in 2011. No party failed to meet the 30% quota and the five parties standing the most candidates selected between 31% and 36% women. Women accounted for just 19% of the 159 Independent candidates.
The Result
The final count ended on Thursday 3 March at 8.30am. Turnout was 65%, which is within the range of pre-crisis elections. The election produced most fragmented Dáil ever, with the largest parties winning modest seat shares and with a large number of Independent candidates and minor party TDs elected. The effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) stood at 4.9, up from 3.6 in 2011. Twenty two percent of TDs were women (up from 15% in 2011) and quotas will no doubt continue to be a mechanism for achieving greater gender balance, not least as they rise to 40% in 2023.
More than half of voters reported deciding how to vote during the three-week campaign and many (about four in ten) gave precedence to choosing individual candidates who would look after their local constituency over choosing parties, governments or policies. Health services and the economy were each the most important issues for about one in five voters.
Almost half of voters thought the economy had improved in the year before the election (and only one in five thought it had disimproved), but only a quarter felt themselves better off.
Consistent with the party's main messages, economic policy and 'stable government' were the most important issues for Fine Gael voters. While economic issues were also influential for those voting for the other main parties, the health service was the most important issue for Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin and Labour Party voters. Water charges -an issue that was to dominate the government formation process -was the most important issue for fewer than one in ten voters, but it was highly salient for those who voted for Sinn Féin, small parties on the left, and some Independents (RTÉ/B&A 2016). Although Sinn Féin's result represented yet another underperformance relative to its showing in opinion polls, it was also a further step in its steady electoral growth. Its basis for growing further is underlined by the fact that it was the strongest party among young voters (under-35s) and that it was strong in both urban and rural constituencies (RTÉ/B&A 2016). It had suffered in the final week of the campaign after its leader, Gerry Adams, did a series of very poor live interviews in which his failure to master the detail of policy was once again exposed. The party also continued to suffer from a relatively poor rate of vote transfers, a legacy of its association with political violence. Nonetheless, after 33 years as leader, Adams was re-elected by the party conference that followed the election.
The performance of the new parties ranged from unspectacular to poor. The Social Democrats retained its three seats and Independents4Change retained their four seats. Renua
Ireland lost all three of its seats and within months its highest-profile figures left the party, despite its entitlement to public funding. The Anti-Austerity Alliance/People Before Profit party gained two seats, as did the (non-party) Independent Alliance. Many other non-party candidates performed well. One of the more unusual achievements was that of the Healy-Rae brothers, whose father had been a TD before them, and who comfortably won two seats in the same (five-seat) constituency. The Green Party returned to the Dáil with two TDs.
The New Government
The new Dáil elected a Ceann Comhairle (Speaker) on 10 March, using a secret ballot of TDs for the first time, although voting was mainly along party lines. The Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Labour Party each ruled out entering cabinet relatively early in the government formation process. As the largest party, Fine Gael had the best chance of forming a coalition, but throughout March, Fianna Fáil also pursued negotiations with the smaller parties and Independents, arguing that they too could lead a government. They abandoned Of the fourteen senior cabinet ministers appointed by Kenny, four retained their portfolios, four were moved within cabinet, and three were promoted into cabinet. Three Independents were appointed as senior ministers and one received a junior ministerial portfolio with the right to sit in cabinet. Government departments were renamed and reconfigured, with 'Housing', 'Planning', 'Rural Affairs' and 'Climate Action' added to Departmental titles (although not all for the first time). The removal of 'Environment' from the title of any government department was sufficiently controversial that it was reinstated within weeks, while the arts community was unhappy with arts policy being lumped into the Department of Regional Development, Rural Affairs, Arts and the Gaeltacht.
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Showing clear signs of a Taoiseach with an acute need to keep on board as many TDs as possible, Kenny increased the number of junior ministries from 15 to 18, the second-highest number ever, meaning that half of Fine Gael TDs would hold a ministerial position. Neither the cabinet, which included four women, nor the wider ministerial corps came close to the genderbalanced government that Kenny had said, in January, that he wanted to achieve. Then again, there was little about this new government that reflected his pre-election wishes.
The Fine Gael-led coalition appears more fragile than any newly-formed Irish government in recent history. Potential threats to its stability come from Fine Gael's multiple Independent coalition partners, from Fianna Fáil, and from within Fine Gael. During the election campaign, Kenny said that he would serve a full term but that he would not lead Fine Gael into another general election. During negotiations for government, one of the Independents described the Taoiseach as 'possibly a political corpse'. (He was later appointed Transport Minister.) The all-but disastrous election result for Fine Gael has increased the likelihood that Kenny will leave office early in the term.
As a result of the government's fragility, the implementation of much of the 160-page Programme for Government negotiated by Fine Gael and Independents must also be in doubt.
Many have pointed to the need for a 'new politics' of negotiation and compromise in parliament to ensure stability and legislative productivity. 
